epistemological views

What is Epistemology?

How do we know what we know? Is it because they tell us so or do we really know? Do we accept truths through a critical evaluation, and in many cases contrary to what society, religion and our parents tell us?

Much of the philosophical tradition in the West constitutes a revolution from the dogmatic “truths” of cultural traditions and political hegemonies. Some examples of this are evident in Socrates, Spinoza, Rousseau and Marx. As Hegel once said philosophy ought to turn the world on its head and infuse a healthy skepticism towards all cultural norms. This idea of individual epistemic transcendence has permeated philosophy since Plato's allegory of the caves, yet knowing as an individual has never been sufficient not even for Plato. The greatest epistemic challenge, in my mind, is applying and sharing that knowledge in and with one's community, and furthermore individually and collectively facilitating dialogue that is epistemologically beneficial between different communities How does one avoid appearing as a crazed lunatic? How can one communicate knowledge?

According to Walter Mignolo, “To answer the question we must question the question”. I apply this assertion to epistemology in that in order to solve the problem of induction whereby one subjective truth can be extended and generalized into an objective truth, we must question the basic premise of epistemology in the Western tradition and that is that knowledge ought to be pursued individually rather than socially. The logic of this argument has some truth to it in that only by separating oneself from a community may one ever hope to objectively analyze that community in order for one's analysis to avoid being skewed by emotional biases. The problem with this logic is that there is a prescription necessarily encoded into every description. What I mean is that we pursue knowledge for a reason, for an end, whether to satisfy our own curiosity, for a pay check, or for a political reason just to mention a few of our unavoidable connections to what we study and why. A lot of my academic focus this past year has been devoted to debunking this myth of objectivity through such classes as Sociology of Knowledge and Feminist Philosophies. My experience studying feminist epistemologies and the reading by Bernstein in Metaphilosophy about cutting through the Objectivism-Relativism dichotomy has made me comfortable with accepting something like what Lorraine Code terms a mitigated relativism (Code, Taking Subjectivity into Account). In addition, Vattimo (who I mentioned in my entry on metaphysics) has further articulated this idea that epistemology ought to be more about collaboration, albeit a critical one, than competition.

I believe that we ought to strive for objectivity and never be content with epistemic or cultural relativism. When I say I support relativism I say this for a very necessary and contingent reason, that is, I support relativism insofar as it facilitates dialogue rather than being content with one's individual truth and/or one's cultures truth. I consent with Vattimo's argument that an epistemology based on consensus is a constant work in progress and requires a great deal of patience to pursue. We must learn to live with uncertainty. We must learn, as many feminist philosophers argue, to approach learning on a case by case basis through an explicit awareness of the spatio-temporal context. As Lynn Hankinson Nelson argues in her work Epistemological Communities, “your knowing or our knowing depends on our knowing- for some `we'” (Nelson, 124). To know more about our world we must critically consider why we seek to know in the first place. Moreover, by allowing more people to play significant roles in the production of knowledge we are expanding and creating a dialogue in and between epistemological communities. Just think, even when we are learning about something for a job for a salary how often is the fruit of that labor not just for oneself but to support one's family. At first glance many of us seek knowledge for apparently selfish reasons, for money, for power, for fame, but underneath our veil of individualism lies social relationships that constitute our most essential ontology. Thus, when we seek to know let's take a moment to consider for whom we are knowing for.

Approaching epistemology within the context of its production requires an awareness of the political motivations and contexts inherent in all knowledge production. Knowledge is not pursued for some neutral end, for some general fascination with the accumulation of knowledge, but rather “Traditional epistemology has a concealed political purpose: to support the dominant elite” (Addelson- Knower/Doers and Their Moral Problems). Philosophy must show itself for what it is if it ever hopes to become what it is not. What I mean by this is that if philosophy is going to serve the critical role that I think we have assumed it to play (at least since Hegel) we must be aware of elitist complicity so prevalent in professional philosophy in addition to all academia. Even feminist philosophies, which almost universally perceive themselves as subversive of patriarchal and hegemonic traditions, can often find themselves hiding out in their ivory towers as they are unconscious of their complicity to the status quo.

Philosophy is far too theoretical in my opinion. I just read a fascinating work by Kathryn Pryne Addelson called Knower/Doers and Their Moral Problems which addresses this issue from a feminist perspective. I am also persuaded to pursue this argument from Vattimo, who argues that philosophy needs to stop holding out the hope that it will someday return to its foundationalist throne and instead open up to dialogue with such other disciplines such as but in now way limited to sociology. The question we should ask ourselves as philosophers is not whether we can defend our knowledge claims with abstract conceptual analysis or even “rational argumentation”, but how our knowledge claims can be and are implemented in the social world. Besides pumping up one's ego and gaining one professional prestige, it is my view that, a philosophical work has absolutely no real value unless it actually has an impact on the world. Thus I consent to Addelson's assertions that philosophy should move toward, “Taking knowledge as a dynamic process, not as a product to be justified, as traditional epistemologies have done” (Addelson, 268-269). To do this will require that philosophers get their heads out of their books and get their hands dirty. It will require philosophers to empirically verify the applications of their knowledge claims in the social arena. It will require philosophers to engage in dialogue with more than just other philosophers.

What it comes down to is that we cannot know alone and even together knowing is never a finished project. Philosophy, in the western tradition, while time and time again assuming to have unlocked the ultimate box of answers has merely contributed to the historical dialogue that supplies the philosophers of today and tomorrow an ever growing foundation from which to commence their own philosophical inquiries. The cumulative history of philosophy is truly a dialectical process where two views, while sharing something in common, merge and transcend their respective initial views through a collaborative dialogue with different and necessarily disagreeing fellow philosophers. It is only because each philosopher has a distinct approach to understanding reality that the dialogue can expand into unchartered territory. The irony of distinctions synthesizing into unity is strikingly evident in such examples of the progression from Hegel to Marx and on and on into the Marxist tradition. Philosophy can only benefit from enhancing the diversity of contributors to this dialogue. It will require patience, time and most of all a willingness to adapt one's own philosophy to something beyond the dominant paradigms in the western tradition. The current specializations in philosophy and through academia at large are most unconducive to facilitating a more holistic and inclusive understanding of our shared reality.

In conclusion, how can we see the same thing if we all are looking at it from different angles, through the inherent distinctions in our individual subjectivities? How can we share a single objective and absolute Truth? Returning to Mignolo's assertion that to answer the question we must question the question, we can't see one Truth or one reality but we shouldn't have to because this question is the wrong question to ask. The question we ought to be asking ourselves is not how we can get them to see what we see, but rather how we can share with each other what we both already see. We can't see the same thing, because our way of looking at it is always going to be particular in some way, but if we really want to know it is not about winning any argument but rather about opening up the philosophical dialogue to anyone and everyone (inside and outside the philosophical community). As is a popular argument in refutation of relativism, won't judgments have to be eventually made whereby one truth is adopted as the truth over other equally subjective truths? My response to this is that yes, judgments will have to be made but let us not make them prematurely. Before we decide on the truths our society out to live by and internalize let us listen to all those who have been denied a voice for so long, because they have something to say, something I believe we all deserve and need to hear.